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Abstract
If a decision maker, in a world of uncertainty a la Anscombe and Aumann (1963),
can choose acts according to some objective probability distribution (by throwing
dice for instance) from any given set of acts, then there is no set of acts that allows
an experimenter to test more than the Axiom of EUOL (that the DM evaluates
objective lotteries with an expected utility function). In fact there is no (common)
experimental design that allows an experimenter to test more than EUOL. For
any decision problem (or set of decision problems), for any preference relation that
satisfies the Axiom EUOL, and for any optimal choice (or collection of choices) given
this preference relation, there is another preference relation that satisfies EUOL plus
the Savage axioms, for which this choice is also optimal.
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1 Introduction
Suppose a decision maker (DM) is asked to make choices in world in which there is, in
addition to possibly risk, also Knightian uncertainty.1 Risk is understood to mean that
there is an objective and known probability distribution which describes it. Uncertainty
is such that there is a set of states of nature, and nature will ultimately choose one state
to realize, but there is no known objective probability distribution with which nature does
this.
The decision maker is asked to choose from the set of all acts. An act, as defined by
Anscombe and Aumann (1963), is a function that attaches objective probability distribu-
tions over monetary outcomes to every state of nature.
Savage (1954) has provided axioms a preference relation over acts should satisfy such
that a DM with such a preference relation behaves as if she is guided in her decisions by
two objects. One, she holds an expected utility function in the sense of von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944). Two, she holds a unique subjective belief, which is a distribution
over the states of nature, with which she evaluates all acts.
It is well known that not all individuals behave as if they have expected utility func-
tions for objective lotteries, since at least Allais (1953). Supposing individuals do behave
as if they have expected utility functions for objective lotteries Ellsberg’s (1961) exper-
iments were designed to test whether individuals’ choices are consistent with Savage’s
(1954) axioms.2 In this paper I ask whether it is at all possible to design an experiment
that can be used to differentiate between preferences that satisfy only the axiom that
objective lotteries are evaluated according to some expected utility function (Axiom Ex-
pected Utility of Objective Lotteries; EUOL) and preferences satisfying this axiom plus
the Savage axioms.3 My answer is that it is not possible if two things are true.
First, the DM when given a decision problem, a set of acts, is allowed to choose an
act randomly.4 To put this in the language of game theory, I call the set of acts, the
decision maker has to choose from, her set of pure strategies. I find it difficult to deny the
DM to choose from the bigger set of mixed strategies, i.e. the set of objective probability
distribution over the set of acts given to her. This assumption, if one can call it that,
seems very uncontroversial to me. After all, we always allow this in the analysis of games,
such as matching pennies, for instance. I simply “extend” it, following Raiffa (1961) to
one-player games.
Second, if I allow the DM to choose random acts, I must complete the DM’s preference
to cover the space of not only all acts, but also all random acts. The only rational way
to do this, in my opinion, I provide as an axiom, which I call the Axiom of Point-Wise
1This is the distinction made by Knight (1921).
2Such as those experiments surveyed in Camerer and Weber (1992). The evidence is interpreted to
indicate that individuals are uncertainty (or ambiguity) averse.
3Alternative preference relations to Savage’s that have been proposed include Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989), Schmeidler (1989), Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), and Maccheroni, Marinacci, and
Rustichini (2006).
4This idea was first proposed by Raiffa (1961). In fact, this paper can be understood of a formalization
of the full consequences of Raiffa’s (1961) argument.
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Understanding of (Objective) Mixtures over Acts (Axiom PUMA). It says that the DM
applies the randomization over acts in every state. Thus, the DM generates for every state
a new objective lottery, the combination of the objective lotteries given by the various
acts and the objective probability distribution over acts. This gives rise to a new act
in the space of all acts (not all random acts). The Axiom PUMA then finally says that
the DM considers the random act and the such constructed new act as identical (she is
indifferent between the two). This completes the description of the DM’s preferences over
all random acts.
In other words, the DM faces three kinds of uncertainty. Once states realize she faces
known objective randomness. States are realized subject to unknown (possibly subjective)
uncertainty. Acts are chosen by the DM herself according to some, obviously objectively
known randomness. The Axiom PUMA simply says that the two sources of objective
uncertainty can be combined to provide a single objective uncertainty (for every state).
In fact if one accepts (as one must as far as I can see) that both sources of objective
randomness are of the same “order”, the axiom PUMA really follows from EUOL (by
force of the reduction of compound lotteries).
The main result of this paper is then as follows. For any preference relation that
satisfies Axioms EUOL and PUMA and any given single decision problem (a set of acts)
and any optimal random choice from this decision problem (given the preference) there
is another preference relation satisfying the Savage axioms for which the given choice
is also optimal. Thus, there is no single decision problem that allows an observer to
conclude that the DM’s preferences are not consistent with the Savage axioms (under the
assumption that they are consistent with von-Neumann Morgenstern axioms for objective
lotteries). Of course, that individuals’ preferences do not necessarily satisfy the von-
Neumann Morgenstern axioms is well known since at least Allais (1953). I then also
argue that there is also no set of decision problems which could be used to differentiate
Savage from non-Savage preferences, under the assumption of EUOL.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a single example, a small variation
of Ellsberg’s (1961) experimental design, which is thoroughly discussed to demonstrate
the main theorem of the paper as well as the key Axiom of Point-Wise Understanding of
(Objective) Mixtures over Acts (PUMA). It has four subsections, each dedicated to a class
of experimental designs. In Subsection 2.1 the DM is given a single decision problem. In
Subsection 2.2 the DM is given a set of decision problems, with the understanding that
one will be objectively randomly chosen to be used to pay the DM. In Subsection 2.3
the DM is again given a set of decision problems, with the understanding now that the
DM is paid the sum of all the consequences of her choices. In Subsection 2.4 the DM is
allowed to hold beliefs over the correlation of the state of nature and the sequences of
decision problems given to her. The argument given there is known and has been discussed
extensively already by Shmaya and Yariv (2008), see also Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2011).
Section 3 then provides the formal setup. Sections 4 provides the main theorem in full
generality for a single decision problem (generalizing Subsection 2.1). Sections 5 and 6
(generalizing Subsections 2.2 and 2.3) discuss the cases in which the DM is given multiple
decision problems.
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2 A motivating example
In this section I will discuss as my prime example a slight variation of Ellsberg’s 2-color urn
problem. The variation is there to avoid having to deal with indifferences, and, thus, to
make the explanation simpler. All results of this paper are illustrated using this example
and then proven in full generality in the main body of this paper.
There are two urns, a risky and an ambiguous one. The risky urn contains 100 balls, of
which 49 are red, 49 are white, and 2 are blue. The ambiguous urn contains 100 balls, all
of which are white or red. The exact composition of red and white balls in the ambiguous
urn is not known.
The decision maker (DM) will have to make choices from subsets of the sets of all acts.
While acts are defined in Section 3, in this section it suffices to consider only the following
three acts. Act f0 pays out 1 monetary unit if we draw a red ball from the risky urn and
pays out 0 otherwise. This is, therefore, a constant act, as its payout does not depend on
the composition of the ambiguous urn. Act f1 pays out 1 monetary unit if we draw a red
ball from the ambiguous urn and pays out 0 otherwise. Act f2 pays out 1 monetary unit
if we draw a white ball from the ambiguous urn and pays out 0 otherwise.
It is useful and customary to model this situation as there being a state space
Ω = {R,W}, the state being the color of the ball which was randomly drawn from
the ambiguous urn. For each state we record the objective probability of winning 1 mon-
etary unit. Note that the outcome space is simply Y = {0, 1}. The three acts can thus
be summarized in the following table.
state f0 f1 f2
R 49
100
1 0
W 49
100
0 1
The three acts can thus be described as vectors of winning probabilities.
Now consider three possible preferences over these three acts. Preference 0 is not
consistent with the Savage axioms and given by f0 0 f1 ∼ f2. The other two are
consistent with the Savage axioms and given by f1 1 f0 1 f2 and f2 2 f0 2 f1.
Preference 1 is induced by a subjective belief that places sufficiently high weight on
state R, while preference 2 is induced by a subjective belief that places sufficiently high
weight on state W .
The question I would now like to address is this: Can I design an experiment that
allows me to conclude that the DM has definitely preference 0 and not 1 or 2. My
answer will be “No!” I now discuss four possible ways of trying to design experiments with
the aim to differentiate between preference 0 on the on hand and 1 or 2 on the other.
The first approach is to give the DM a single decision problem. The second approach is to
give the DM multiple decision problems and a fixed probability distribution over decision
problems. Then the DM is asked to make choices for all these decision problems, before
finally an “active” decision problem will be chosen according to the given probability
distribution and payment will be made according to the choice of the DM for the active
decision problem. The third approach is to again give the DM multiple decision problems.
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Again the DM is asked to make choices for all given decision problems. In this case,
however, after the DM made all her choices, every single choice will be independently
executed and the DM will be paid out the sum of all payments. The fourth approach,
finally, is one that has been discussed extensively by Shmaya and Yariv (2008). I will
only discuss it briefly in this section. It is as follows. The DM is told that she will have
to make choices from multiple decision problems, but is not yet told what all decision
problems are. Her choices will be recorded and ultimately she will be paid either the sum
as in the third approach, or the appropriate payment of a randomly chosen active decision
problem as in the second approach.
2.1 A single decision problem
The DM is now given a single decision problem. There are 4 possible non-trivial decision
problems given the three acts. Suppose the DM is given the decision problem to choose
from {f0, f1}. What can we learn from the DM’s potential choices? If she chooses f0 the
DM could have preference 0 or 2. If she chooses f1 her preferences could be either 0
or 1. No matter what her choice is we cannot conclude that she must have preference
0. Similarly the decision problems {f0, f2} and {f1, f2} if posed alone cannot be used
to deduce that a DM must have preference 0.
The final and, of course, most interesting decision problem is the one with all three
acts {f0, f1, f2}. I shall now argue, and this is the crux of this paper, that for any rational
DM two things must be true. First, the DM must be allowed to choose an act randomly.
In the language of game theory, I consider the three acts given in the decision problem as
the DM’s pure strategies. Her mixed strategies are all probability distributions over her
pure strategies. Given that the DM chooses this probability distribution it is of course
objectively known to her. This assumption, always made in game theory, can hardly be
controversial.
Second, the DM interprets the effect of objectively randomizing among acts in a point-
wise way. This I shall, in the main body of the paper, call the Axiom of Point-Wise Un-
derstanding of (Objective) Mixtures over Acts (PUMA). It states that the DM considers
every possible state and considers the new objective probability distribution that would
result if this were the state. For the given decision problem these two assumptions imply
that the DM can actually choose from a bigger set of acts. In fact, the DM can choose
from the convex hull of these three acts. Among all the possible mixed strategies, one
particularly interesting one, denote it by σ, is to choose act f1 and act f2 with equal prob-
ability of 1
2
each. The axiom PUMA then says that the DM must be indifferent between
σ and the (constant) act which gives her a winning probability of 1
2
in each of the two
states.
In order to help the reader to understand the axiom PUMA better I here offer a
discussion of its consequences for a real-life situation with Knightian uncertainty. Your
English friend Bertie Wooster offers you a bet on a cricket game between two local cricket
teams. You have really no understanding of cricket and have no clue as to which of the
two teams is better. You are, however, guaranteed that the game will end in one team
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winning (and the other losing). Bertie, being fair-minded, allows you to choose which
team you want to bet on and offers you even odds (of 1:1) in either case. So if you chose
to put one pound sterling on team A, you receive two pounds sterling if team A wins (a
net win of 1), and nothing if team B wins (a net loss of 1). The analogue is true if you
decide to put your bet on team B. You can also decline to bet at all, but then you would
be considered, by Bertie and many others, as “unsportsmanlike”, which is something you
would like to avoid, even if perhaps not at all cost.
Now what does Axiom PUMA imply in this setting? Suppose you decide to accept
the bet and choose to flip a fair coin to decide on which team you will bet. Then axiom
PUMA says that you realize that the outcome of the coin-toss and, thus, your choice,
is independent of the state of nature (being the team that will ultimately win). Thus,
you consider the probability of team A winning a fixed thing (although unknown), which
is certainly not influenced by the outcome of your own independent coin-toss or your
ultimate decision.
A second axiom (of Expected Utility for Objective Lotteries (EUOL); usually assumed
in the literature) states that the DM uses one and the same expected utility function to
evaluate objective lotteries in every state. That is, if she knew the state, she would use
this given expected utility function to evaluate the act (that is, the lottery induced by
the act in the given state). The axiom EUOL further states that if two acts are such that
one provides a higher expected utility than the other in each and every state, then the
former act must be strictly preferred over the latter.5 For the decision problem at hand,
allowing the DM to choose acts randomly in conjunction with the two axioms imply that
act f0 is “strictly dominated” by the random act σ and, thus, can never be chosen by the
DM (if her preferences satisfy the two axioms).
But this means that any rational DM’s realized choices can only be either f1 or f2.
From this we again learn very little, not enough to let us conclude that the DM must
have preference 0 as one of the Savage-consistent preferences 1 or 2 is also always
consistent with the DM’s choice.
In Section 4 in Theorem 1 I show that, for any finite state space, for any outcome
space, for any single decision problem and for any preference satisfying Axioms EUOL
and PUMA there is a preference that satisfies the Savage axioms that provides the exact
same optimal choices for the given decision problem. The exact statement of this theorem
as well as its proof is given in Section 4, but a sketch of the proof can be given here.
Any act can be written as a vector of expected utilities, where each coordinate repre-
sents one state. In the above example an act was even more simply a vector of winning
probabilities, one entry for each of the two states. Fix an arbitrary set of acts, that is
fix an arbitrary set of vectors in the appropriate subset of IRk, where k is the number of
states in Ω. Then the axiom PUMA implies that the actual available sets of acts in vector
representation is simply the convex hull of all the given vectors. Suppose we have an act
with an expected utility vector for which there is another expected utility vector in this
5In fact if one accepts that both sources of objective randomness, the DM’s personally generated
randomness and the objective lotteries paid out in the end, are of the same kind, then Axiom EUOL
implies Axiom PUMA.
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Figure 1: Dots are expected utility (probability of winning) vectors for a given set of acts in the case of
two states and outcomes only 0 or 1. Any expected utility vector not on the solid (or dashed) boundary
cannot be chosen by a DM whose preferences satisfy axioms EUOL and PUMA. The dotted line is a
separating hyperplane, which yields beliefs that can be used to rationalize the choice of act leading to
the expected utility vector that is on the hyperplane.
convex hull to the “upper right” of it. Then there is a possibly random act (by axiom
PUMA) such that, by the axiom EUOL, this random acts must be strictly preferred over
the original act.
In other words any act that has an expected utility vector in the interior of the above
mentioned convex hull cannot be chosen by any DM whose preference satisfies axioms
EUOL and PUMA. On the other hand acts with expected utility vectors on the (upper-
right) boundary of the afore mentioned convex hull can be an optimal for a DM whose
preference satisfies the Savage axioms. By the separating hyperplane theorem there is a
belief that makes this choice optimal.
Thus, any choice a DM makes, whose preferences satisfy axiom EUOL and PUMA,
can also be made by a DM whose preferences satisfy the Savage axioms.
A graphical depiction of the proof of Theorem 1 is given in Figure 1. Dots are expected
utility (probability of winning) vectors for a given set of acts in the case of two states,
Ω = {R,W}, and outcome set Y = {0, 1}. The convex hull of all possible expected
utility (probability of winning) vectors induced by randomly chosen acts is given by the
set bounded by the solid lines. Any expected utility vector not on the thick solid (or thick
dashed) boundary cannot be chosen by a DM whose preferences satisfy axioms EUOL
and PUMA. The dotted line is a separating hyperplane, which yields beliefs that can be
used to rationalize the choice of act leading to the expected utility vector that is on the
hyperplane.
7
2.2 A randomly chosen “active” decision problem
Another attempt to infer a DM’s true preferences from her choices can be given as follows.
Suppose we do not give the DM one decision problem, but two (or more). For the example
the two most promising decision problems are {f0, f1} and {f0, f2}. The DM is asked to
make choices for both decision problems. Then, one decision problem is chosen according
to some fixed objective probability distribution (which the DM is informed about) to be
“active”, meaning the DM is paid according to her choice for the active decision problem
only. For the example, say each of the two decision problem is chosen to be active with
equal probability 1
2
.
Now, one might hope that the DM with non-Savage preference 0 will choose f0 in
both decision problems, thus differentiating herself from a DM with Savage-preferences
1 or 2. If the DM’s preference satisfies EUOL and PUMA this, however, is not the
case. Note that the DM has now four pure strategies: choose f0 or f1 for the first decision
problem and f0 or f2 in the second. Note that if the DM chooses f1 in the first and f2
in the second decision problem, the objective distribution over decision problems, in this
case, does the same job the DM’s chosen randomization over acts did in the example with
a single decision problem. Under axiom PUMA choosing f1 in the first and f2 in the
second decision problem gives the DM another act which has winning probability of 1
2
in
each state, and, thus “strictly dominates” act f0.
This means that no DM whose preference satisfies axioms EUOL and PUMA can
choose f0 in both decision problems. Any other choice, however, is also consistent with
one of the two Savage-preferences 1 or 2. Thus, as in the case of a single decision
problem, this design does not allow us to determine whether a DM’s preference, as long
as it satisfies axioms EUOL and PUMA, violates the Savage axioms or not.
To see that this point holds in full generality note that this design actually can be seen
to be the same as giving the DM a single decision problem. It is as if the DM is simply
given a set of 4 random acts to choose from, the DM can even randomize among those if
that is useful to her. Thus, Theorem 1, for the single decision problem case, applies also
in this case.
2.3 Multiple decision problems
My final attempt to infer a DM’s true preferences from her choices is as follows. The
DM is, as in the previous subsection, given not one but two or more decision problems.
The DM provides a list of choices, one for each decision problem. After that the DM’s
choices are implemented and the DM is paid the sum of all accruing payments. As in the
previous subsection, the two most promising decision problems are {f0, f1} and {f0, f2}.
The DM is asked to make choices for both decision problems. As before the DM has four
pure strategies.
Suppose the DM has a belief that the probability that a red ball is drawn whenever
we draw a ball from the urn is equal to some µ ∈ [0, 1]. Then the distribution of payoff
in monetary units for each of the four pure strategies and for each belief µ is as follows
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(let p = 49
100
).
payoff f0, f0 f0, f2 f1, f0 f1, f2
2 p2 p(1− µ) µp µ(1− µ)
1 2p(1− p) 1− p(1− µ)− (1− p)µ 1− µp− (1− p)(1− µ) 1− 2µ(1− µ)
0 (1− p)2 (1− p)µ (1− p)(1− µ) (1− µ)µ
Consider first the pure strategy f1, f2. That is, the DM chooses act f1 from the first
decision problem and act f2 from the second. Note that, in this design, the reduction
of compound lotteries is not viable. Consider first the belief that µ = 1
2
(this can be
thought of as the belief that there is an equal number of 50 red and white balls each in
the ambiguous urn). This belief is very different from the belief that µ = 0 or µ = 1 with
equal probability (this can be thought of as the belief that either all balls are red or all
balls ar white with equal probability). Given we have two independent draws from the
ambiguous urn, the resulting distribution of monetary payoffs are very different for the
two different beliefs. In the first case, in which the DM believes that µ = 1
2
with certainty,
it is possible to win twice. That is, a monetary payoff of 2 is possible. In the second case,
in which the DM believes that µ = 0 or µ = 1 with equal probability, a monetary payoff
of 2 is not possible. In fact the two distributions of monetary payoffs for the two beliefs
are given as follows.
payoff µ = 1
2
with prob 1 µ = 0 or µ = 1 with prob 1
2
each
2 1
4
0
1 1
2
1
0 1
4
0
If a risk averse DM could choose between beliefs (which, of course, she cannot), she
would prefer the second belief. In any case the two beliefs (which would be equivalent for
the examples in the previous subsection) are not equivalent here. In fact, this is a point
that has been made by Halevy and Feltkamp (2005).
The implications of this “non-viability” of the reduction of compound lotteries, is
this. We must allow the DM to hold a “higher order” belief. As it has possible payoff
consequences, the DM must be allowed to have a belief that is a probability distribution
over the number (or proportion) of red balls in the urn.
This implies that we have to modify not only the payoff space (which has to be adapted
from Y = {0, 1} to Y ∗ = {0, 1, 2} to accommodate all possible sums of monetary payoffs)
but also the state space from Ω = {R,W} to Ω∗ ⊂ ∆(Ω). I assume that Ω∗ can be taken
to be any finite subset.
But then, for each new state, say µ ∈ Ω∗, an act specifies an objective lottery, which the
DM, by force of axiom EUOL, evaluates with her given expected utility function. Thus,
the problem is again identical to the case of giving the DM a single decision problem
with four acts to choose from. Allowing the DM to objectively randomize when choosing
acts, and assuming axiom PUMA the main result of this paper, Theorem 1 again applies.
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There is no set of decision problems we can use to differentiate between any preference
that satisfies axioms EUOL and PUMA and a Savage preference.
To complete the example, note that, no matter how we choose the state space Ω∗
exactly, the pure strategy f0, f0 is strictly dominated by the mixture of
1
2
(f0, f2)+
1
2
(f1, f0).
Thus, no DM with preferences satisfying axioms EUOL and PUMA can choose f0, f0. All
other choices, however, are consistent also with a Savage preference. Thus, if a DM
chooses f0, f0 she is simply irrational (if the reader buys my argument that axiom PUMA
is a requirement of rationality).
2.4 Possibly state-dependent sequence of decision problems
I personally do not know whether I have Savage preferences or something like preference
0. Let us go back to a single decision problem, which here could now be one of these
two: {f0, f1} and {f0, f2}. Suppose I am asked to choose from the first decision problem.
Suppose I have Savage preferences. How should I form my belief about the states? I
have only two pieces of information to help me form such a belief. The first piece of
information is that there are two colors, red and white. I could believe that somehow
red is more prevalent in all things, or more liked by people who fill urns for strange
experiments. Of course I could also believe the opposite.
The only other piece of information is the fact that I have been asked to choose from
this decision problem and not another. I can have beliefs about the correlation between
states and the kind of decision problem I am facing. This does not seem unreasonable to
me. In fact I can believe that if the state is red then I am given the second decision problem
and when it is white I am given the first one. In some sense I then have preferences 0,
but derived from a Bayesian model, in which I allow beliefs to be not only over states,
but also over the sequence of decision problems I am given for the different states.
This criticism of models of ambiguity aversion is not mine. It has been made in
perhaps its strongest form by Shmaya and Yariv (2008) to which I refer the reader for a
full analysis. See also Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2011).
3 Setup
Let Ω denote the finite set of states. Let ∆(Ω) denote the set of all possible (subjective)
beliefs over states. Let Y denote the finite set of outcomes. Let ∆(Y ) denote all objective
lotteries (all probability distributions over outcomes). Let f : Ω → ∆(Y ) denote an
act. Let F denote the set of all acts. Let ∆(F) denote the set of objective probability
distributions over F .
Let  denote a preference relation on ∆(F). Let ∼ denote its induced indifference
relation, and let  denote its induced strict preference relation.
Let u : ∆(Y )→ IR+ denote an expected utility function (for objective lotteries). For
f ∈ F let u(f) denote the vector of the state-wise application of function u. That is,
u(f) = (u(f(ω1), ..., u(f(ωk))) if Ω = {ω1, ..., ωk}. For f, g ∈ F denote u(f)  u(g) if
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u(f(ω)) > u(g(ω)) for all ω ∈ Ω.
Axiom 1 (Expected Utility on Objective Lotteries (EUOL)) There is a utility
function u : ∆(Y )→ IR+, such that for all f, g ∈ F if u(f) u(g) then f  g.
For σ ∈ ∆(F) let supp(σ) ⊂ F denote the support of σ. Furthermore, by s(σ)
denote the state-wise application of the randomization. That is s(σ)(ω) is the objective
distribution in state ω induced by σ, for all ω ∈ Ω.
Axiom 2 (Point-Wise Understanding of (Objective) Mixtures over acts (PUMA))
For any σ ∈ ∆(F) preference relation  satisfies σ ∼ s(σ).
Thus, if a preference relation satisfies Axiom PUMA then its domain can be taken to
be F , as, in this case, we have essentially that ∆(F) = F . This axiom, thus, states that
the objective randomization over acts (to be chosen by the DM) has no influence on the
(subjective) likelihood of states ω ∈ Ω.
Axiom 3 (Subjective Expected Utility (SEU)) Preference relation  satisfies the
Savage Axioms.
4 A single decision problem
We shall call F ⊂ F a decision problem. We will F also call the DM’s set of pure
strategies. The DM’s set of mixed strategies is given by ∆(F ).
For decision problem F ⊂ F and preference  let c(F,) =
{σ ∈ ∆(F )|σ  σ′ ∀ σ′ ∈ ∆(F )}. These are the DM’s optimal mixed strategies
given decision problem F (her mixed best replies to decision problem F ).
Note that, depending on the preference , it is well possible that a pure strategy which
has positive weight in an optimal mixed strategy is not itself optimal. In other words, the
set of optimal mixed strategies is, in contrast to the case of standard game theory, not
necessarily spanned by the optimal pure strategies.
Theorem 1 For any  satisfying Axioms EUOL and PUMA, any decision problem F ⊂
F , and any σ ∈ c(F,) there is a preference relation ′ satisfying Axiom SEU such that
σ ∈ c(F,).
Proof: Given  satisfies Axiom EUOL there is an expected utility function u : ∆(Y ) →
IR+ which is applied in each state. Let U(F ) = {u(f)|f ∈ F} denote the space of
expected utility vectors induced by decision problem F . Let U¯(F ) denote the convex hull
of U(F ). The DM can obtain any expected utility payoff vector in U¯(F ) by choosing the
appropriate available mixed strategy σ ∈ ∆(F ).
Let σ ∈ ∆(F ) be a mixed strategy with induced expected utility vector uσ with the
property that there is a u′ ∈ U¯(F ) such that u′(ω) > uσ(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. That is, u′
strictly dominates uσ. Then there is a σ′ ∈ ∆(F ) with induced expected utility vector
u′. But then, as  satisfies Axioms PUMA and EUOL, σ′  σ. Thus, no DM with
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preferences satisfying Axioms EUOL and PUMA will choose σ. Now, let σ ∈ ∆(F ) be a
mixed strategy with induced expected utility vector uσ with the property that uσ is on the
“top-right” boundary of U¯(F ). That is, there is no u′ ∈ U¯(F ) such that u′(ω) > uσ(ω) for
all ω ∈ Ω. Then, by the separating hyperplane theorem, there is a preference ′ satisfying
Axiom SEU such that σ ∈ c(F,′). QED
5 Randomly chosen active decision problems
Suppose a DM has to make choices from a set of decision problems G = {F1, ..., Fn}. The
DM is asked to announce her choices for all of these decision problems. After choices are
made, the “active” decision problem is chosen according to some a priori known objective
probability distribution γ ∈ ∆(G). The chosen act from the active decision is then used
to pay out the DM.
This problem is identical to making one choice from a single decision problem. To
see this note that a DM’s pure strategies are given by all functions s : G → F with the
restriction that s(Fi) ∈ Fi. Each pure strategy combined with the objectively known
probability distribution over decision problems γ is equivalent to an objectively random
act (a σ ∈ ∆(F)). This means that for each pure strategy s there is an act f ∈ F such
that the DM must be indifferent between pure strategy s and act f if her preference
satisfies axiom PUMA. But then the DM’s overall decision problem is identical to a single
decision problem as studied in Section 4. Thus, Theorem 1 applies, and no such set of
decision problems can be used to differentiate the set of preferences that satisfy axioms
EUOL and PUMA from the set of preferences that satisfy the Savage axioms.
6 Multiple decision problems
Suppose a DM has to make choices from a set of decision problems G = {F1, ..., Fn}.
The DM is asked to announce her choices for all of these decision problems. After all
choices are made, the DM is paid the sum of all monetary payments resulting from her
choices and the realization of randomness. Randomness realizes in an i.i.d. fashion. In
the language of urns, a ball is randomly drawn for the first choice, then put back into the
urn and another ball is independently drawn for the second choice, and so on. The DM
makes all her choices before she learns anything about the composition of the ambiguous
urn.
As outcomes are now the sum of multiple possible outcomes, the outcome space has
to be adapted. Let Y ∗ denote the appropriate outcome space, derived from the outcome
space for single lotteries Y . That is, Y ∗ = {y∗ =∑ni yi|yi ∈ Y ∀ i}.
As demonstrated in the example in Section 2.3 for such decision problems the DM
must be allowed to have a bigger state space as well. Let this new state space Ω∗ ⊂ ∆(Ω)
be a finite subset of the set of all probability distributions over Ω.
As in the previous section the DM has pure strategies s : G→ F with the restriction
that s(Fi) ∈ Fi. Given this adapted setup, for any new state µ ∈ Ω∗, a pure strategy in-
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duces an objective lottery over the new outcome space Y ∗. A pure strategy s is, therefore,
simply an act given the new state space and outcome space. Thus, the DM’s problem
is again identical to a single decision problem with, however, the new state and outcome
space. Again, Theorem 1 from Section 4 applies. Again, no such set of decision problems
can be used to differentiate the set of preferences that satisfy axioms EUOL and PUMA
from the set of preferences that satisfies the Savage axioms.
7 Discussion
Another way to view the main result of this paper is this. If an experimenter wants to
identify whether a decision maker (DM), under the assumption of Axiom EUOL (expected
utility for objective lotteries), has a preference relation which satisfies the Savage axioms
or not, then the experimenter needs to give the DM a non-convex set of acts to choose
from. However, as the DM can freely and objectively randomize when choosing from the
given set of acts, by Axiom EUOL, the DM in fact faces a convex set of acts. Thus, it
is not possible to force the DM to make a choice from a non-convex set of acts. Under
the assumption of EUOL, the experimenter cannot, therefore, elicit choices that would
be inconsistent with Savage preference. Therefore, the experimenter’s observations can
never be used to test more than the Axiom EUOL.
The experimental study by Halevy (2007) finds that individuals who are uncertainty
averse (using the Ellsberg (1961) 2-color urn experiment) typically also fail to reduce
compound lotteries and vice versa (using experiments with 2-color urns with different
objectively random compositions). In the light of the main result of this paper, this is not
surprising, as it demonstrates that any choice that is a violation of the Savage axioms,
must be a violation of Axiom EUOL, which of course implies that the DM is able to
reduce compound lotteries correctly.
Lo (2000) has shown that in the original Savage (1954) framework, in which outcomes
are not necessarily objective lotteries over monetary outcomes, as long as a DM’s prefer-
ence relation satisfies Savage’s (1954) Axiom P3 (eventwise monotonicity, as it was termed
by Machina and Schmeidler (1992)), her choices can also be rationalized by a preference
relation satisfying all of Savage’s axioms. This, however, comes at the cost of having to
change the DM’s preference intensity over outcomes. This is possibly plausible in some
cases, but not so much in the case where outcomes are objective lotteries. If outcomes
were objective lotteries, Lo’s (2000) result would say that for any DM whose preferences
satisfy Axiom P3, there is another DM who acts as if she has a single belief over states
of nature, but evaluates objective lotteries necessarily quite differently than the first DM.
In particular, if the first DM’s preferences satisfy EUOL, then the second DM’s typically
would not. Whether two DM’s agree or disagree about how to evaluate objective lotteries,
is, however, quite easy to test separately.
My point in this paper is a very different one. If a DM evaluates objective lotteries
with a given expected utility function and has otherwise “wild” preferences, then there is
another DM who also evaluates objective lotteries with the same expected utility function
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and also satisfies the Savage axioms and who makes exactly the same choice(s), provided
we “allow” the DM to choose from a given set of acts randomly.
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